Policy Reports/Long Pieces
Populism and Democracy
Over-Diagnosing Democratic Decline. The Progress Network. Mar. 14, 2023.
Concern has become widespread that with the election of populist leaders intent on undermining checks on their power, democracy is in retreat around the globe. Yet a debate has emerged recently over whether democratic backsliding is widespread or indicative of reporting bias in measuring its underlying components--as attention to backsliding is increasing, perhaps commentators and scholars have been noticing examples of backsliding that they wouldn't have noticed before.
I agree that democratic backsliding has been over-diagnosed in recent cases, but for a different reason: that many definitions of democracy place too much focus on liberal institutional and norms elements of democracy relative to free and fair elections. I advance a minimalist conception of democracy and argue that when diagnosing backsliding, we should focus on the likelihood that elections will be relatively competitive. To be sure, several liberal conditions, such as freedom of the press and of political expression are necessary for open competition. But if these are ensured to a reasonable degree, the remaining focus should be should be on the quality of the conduct of elections.
Within the context of this conception of democracy, I reconsider several cases of democratic backsliding and argue that while many cases have had either full democratic breakdown (Nicaragua, Venezuela) or a significant reduction in democratic competition (Hungary, Turkey), democratic backsliding has been over-diagnosed in other important cases (Brazil, Poland, Slovenia).
Repel and Rebuild: Expanding the Playbook against Populism. Jan. 5, 2023.
We find that the number of populist leaders in power around the world continues to decline, down to a 20-year low of 11 at the end of 2022. Populist leaders fell from power in Brazil, the Philippines, Slovenia, and Sri Lanka. But we also find that while in previous years, opposition parties defeated populists by forming broad coalitions to depose them, this tactic met with mixed success in 2022. Moreover, several of the post-populist coalition governments that came to power in 2021 collapsed in 2022 (Bulgaria, Israel). In western Europe, right-wing populists did well in Swedish elections and came to power in Italy on the weakness of the center-left and their misguided attempt to paint populists in these countries as anti-democratic.
Non-populist parties must adopt different tactics when running against populists depending on if they're in power or if they're in opposition. If populists are in power and have proven divisive, the non-populist opposition should form a broad coalition and focus on the harms of the populist leader, as we described in A Playbook against Populism. But if the populists are in opposition, non-populists should eschew negative campaigning and focus on their substantive agenda. Negative campaigning against a populist opposition risks reinforcing their charge that mainstream parties downplay their legitimate concerns.
One region that has seen surprising success in the wake of populist leaders is Latin America. Here, younger centrist leaders learned that the public was tired of the heated rhetoric and overblown promises of populist leaders and have responded by offering a more moderate, yet progressive agenda. While several of these new leaders face significant challenges from an opposition-led congress, they have begun to lower the political temperature after decades of competition between left and right-wing populists.
A Playbook against Populism? Populist Leadership in Decline in 2021. Jan. 6, 2022.
In our annual update to our Populists in Power database, we find that the number of populist leaders in power around the world has dropped to 13, the lowest level since 2004. Four populist leaders fell from power in 2021, three of them through election loss. Two factors were important in these losses. One, populist leaders struggled with handling Covid-19. They had higher covid death rates than non-populist leaders. Populist leaders in Europe took a substantial polling hit, even before their countries had high covid death rates. This suggests that the pandemic reminded voters of the importance of seriousness and expertise in policymaking and that they were less favorable toward leaders who had less of a reputation for these.
Two, unusually broad opposition coalitions formed to depose these leaders. Previously divided opposition parties either formally or informally united to focus on removing the populist leader from power. This suggests that opposition parties can defeat populists if they remain focused and do not let their other substantive disagreements distract from this goal. The concern with such coalitions however is that once they take government, they collapse under the weight of their substantive difference. We examine the case of the post-populist coalition in Israel, which has been in power since June 2021 and is the most diverse in the country's history. We find that it has been able to remain in power because of the constant threat of populist Netanyahu's return but, critically, the member parties have focused their agenda on measures to present the rise of future populist leaders and other less controversial policies.
We conclude that such 'grand opposition coalitions' provide great promise for removing populist leaders if the parties can stay focused on removing the populist leader and setting the institutional conditions for preventing the rise of another when in office. We see evidence of such coalitions forming in other populist-led countries like Slovenia, Hungary, and Turkey. But there's also reason to believe that this may be less successful in the future: several remaining populist leaders have make institutional changes to insulate their power and may be more difficult to remove
Capitalizing on Crisis? Western European Populists and Covid-19, Past and Future. Mar. 5, 2021.
In this piece, we investigate the responses of right-wing populists to Covid-19 and their governments' policies in Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden. We find that responses to their governments' policies varied greatly in the initial weeks of Covid-19, ranging from highly restrained responses among Nordic country populists to very aggressive responses by populists in France, the Netherlands, and Spain. Response aggressiveness was positively correlated with case and death rates, although we argue that response aggressiveness was determined at least as much by future concerns regarding coalition formation as it was about substantive criticisms of government policy.
Populists who had restrained themselves in the initial weeks of the pandemic became more critical of their governments into the summer, focusing on non-transparency of policymaking, excessive restrictions on individual freedoms, and a lack of support for small businesses. Unlike in the United States, criticisms of China and Covid-19 conspiracy theories were limited to a few countries and were more common among the public than populist politicians.
We close the piece with a discussion of how the economic fallout from Covid-19 might affect support for populism. Governments have used extensive furlough programs to support businesses and wages but as these programs are wound down, many (especially small) businesses are likely to close. Small business owners are especially likely to support right-wing populists and populists can cater to the economic concerns of this group better than mainstream left and right parties, which depend more on knowledge economy workers less affected by Covid-19. But Covid-19 has also sped up the adoption of new technologies that threaten many knowledge economy jobs in western Europe. While these workers are currently unlikely to support right-wing populists, job loss and the attendant loss of social status could increase support for populists among them in the future.
Populists in Power: Perils and Prospects in 2021. Jan. 18, 2021.
Donald Trump’s attempts to subvert the democratic process and peaceful transfer of power illustrate the risks associated with populist leaders, who undermine the norms and institutions on which liberal democracy depends. But Trump is just the most salient example of populists in power around the world. Our annual study takes stock of the prevalence of populist leaders globally at the start of 2021. We find that the number of populist leaders in power around the world is down from its mid-2010s high, but it is close to the same level as at the start of the last decade. The composition of populist leaders in power has shifted. Cultural populists now constitute the majority of all populist leaders.
Trump’s loss may constrain other populist leaders around the world as they will likely have less international support and voters may become tired of their antics. But his absence is unlikely to damage their electoral prospects since most came to power before Trump was elected and base their support on domestic issues. Most are savvy and will adjust their behavior accordingly. US institutions are strong and held up against Trump’s attempts to subvert them. Countries with weaker institutions may be less likely to withstand a similar onslaught by a populist leader.
The Covid-19 pandemic has had some counterintuitive political effects, with populist leaders who took Covid-19 seriously in many cases receiving a polling boost. Opposition populist parties in western Europe took a polling hit in the first three months of the pandemic but had returned almost to their pre-Covid-19 polling levels by the end of October. The economic fallout from Covid-19 will create opportunities for cultural populists in advanced democracies.
Pandemic Populism: An Analysis of Populist Leaders' Responses to Covid-19. Aug. 17, 2020.
While the perception of populist politicians' responses to Covid-19 is that they've downplayed it, we find that this hasn't been the case for most of the populist leaders currently in power in our database. Of the 17 populist leaders in power at the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, we find that only 5 (including Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil) have consistently tried to downplay the significance of the virus. But while 12 of the 17 populists in power took the virus seriously, including adopting science-driven policies and giving a prominent role to experts, we found that their approaches in handling it differed. We found that 4 of our 17 populist leaders took a liberal serious response and didn't use the pandemic to crack down on their opponents. But we also found that 5 of our 17 populist leaders took an illiberal serious response, using the pandemic to try to pass controversial legislation, enact harsh lockdowns, and enforce these lockdowns in ways that were biased against their political opponents. 3 of our 17 leaders took intermediate responses. While the 5 leaders who downplayed the crisis represented all of our three types of populists (Socio-Economic, Anti-Establishment, and Cultural), we found that only Cultural Populists took an illiberal serious response, often using the pandemic to gain the upper hand in the cultural conflicts that they used to attain power. We close with a discussion of how Covid-19 is unlikely to kill populism and may even strengthen it in the long-run.
High Tide? Populism in Power 1990-2020 (with Jordan Kyle). Feb. 7, 2020.
In this piece, we update our Populists in Power database on which democratic countries contain populist leaders through early 2019. We find that the number of populists in power in 2019 was near an all-time high at 19, but that the composition of populist leaders had changed over this period. While in earlier periods, most populist leaders either left-wing populists (which we call Socio-Economic populists) or rose in opposition to a long-entrenched regime (which we call Anti-Establishment populists), most current populist leaders in power are right-wing Cultural Populists. These are leaders like Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro, who mobilize voters over cultural grievances, including opposition to cultural elites and often on issues involving immigration and religious or ethnic minorities.
Over-Diagnosing Democratic Decline. The Progress Network. Mar. 14, 2023.
Concern has become widespread that with the election of populist leaders intent on undermining checks on their power, democracy is in retreat around the globe. Yet a debate has emerged recently over whether democratic backsliding is widespread or indicative of reporting bias in measuring its underlying components--as attention to backsliding is increasing, perhaps commentators and scholars have been noticing examples of backsliding that they wouldn't have noticed before.
I agree that democratic backsliding has been over-diagnosed in recent cases, but for a different reason: that many definitions of democracy place too much focus on liberal institutional and norms elements of democracy relative to free and fair elections. I advance a minimalist conception of democracy and argue that when diagnosing backsliding, we should focus on the likelihood that elections will be relatively competitive. To be sure, several liberal conditions, such as freedom of the press and of political expression are necessary for open competition. But if these are ensured to a reasonable degree, the remaining focus should be should be on the quality of the conduct of elections.
Within the context of this conception of democracy, I reconsider several cases of democratic backsliding and argue that while many cases have had either full democratic breakdown (Nicaragua, Venezuela) or a significant reduction in democratic competition (Hungary, Turkey), democratic backsliding has been over-diagnosed in other important cases (Brazil, Poland, Slovenia).
Repel and Rebuild: Expanding the Playbook against Populism. Jan. 5, 2023.
We find that the number of populist leaders in power around the world continues to decline, down to a 20-year low of 11 at the end of 2022. Populist leaders fell from power in Brazil, the Philippines, Slovenia, and Sri Lanka. But we also find that while in previous years, opposition parties defeated populists by forming broad coalitions to depose them, this tactic met with mixed success in 2022. Moreover, several of the post-populist coalition governments that came to power in 2021 collapsed in 2022 (Bulgaria, Israel). In western Europe, right-wing populists did well in Swedish elections and came to power in Italy on the weakness of the center-left and their misguided attempt to paint populists in these countries as anti-democratic.
Non-populist parties must adopt different tactics when running against populists depending on if they're in power or if they're in opposition. If populists are in power and have proven divisive, the non-populist opposition should form a broad coalition and focus on the harms of the populist leader, as we described in A Playbook against Populism. But if the populists are in opposition, non-populists should eschew negative campaigning and focus on their substantive agenda. Negative campaigning against a populist opposition risks reinforcing their charge that mainstream parties downplay their legitimate concerns.
One region that has seen surprising success in the wake of populist leaders is Latin America. Here, younger centrist leaders learned that the public was tired of the heated rhetoric and overblown promises of populist leaders and have responded by offering a more moderate, yet progressive agenda. While several of these new leaders face significant challenges from an opposition-led congress, they have begun to lower the political temperature after decades of competition between left and right-wing populists.
A Playbook against Populism? Populist Leadership in Decline in 2021. Jan. 6, 2022.
In our annual update to our Populists in Power database, we find that the number of populist leaders in power around the world has dropped to 13, the lowest level since 2004. Four populist leaders fell from power in 2021, three of them through election loss. Two factors were important in these losses. One, populist leaders struggled with handling Covid-19. They had higher covid death rates than non-populist leaders. Populist leaders in Europe took a substantial polling hit, even before their countries had high covid death rates. This suggests that the pandemic reminded voters of the importance of seriousness and expertise in policymaking and that they were less favorable toward leaders who had less of a reputation for these.
Two, unusually broad opposition coalitions formed to depose these leaders. Previously divided opposition parties either formally or informally united to focus on removing the populist leader from power. This suggests that opposition parties can defeat populists if they remain focused and do not let their other substantive disagreements distract from this goal. The concern with such coalitions however is that once they take government, they collapse under the weight of their substantive difference. We examine the case of the post-populist coalition in Israel, which has been in power since June 2021 and is the most diverse in the country's history. We find that it has been able to remain in power because of the constant threat of populist Netanyahu's return but, critically, the member parties have focused their agenda on measures to present the rise of future populist leaders and other less controversial policies.
We conclude that such 'grand opposition coalitions' provide great promise for removing populist leaders if the parties can stay focused on removing the populist leader and setting the institutional conditions for preventing the rise of another when in office. We see evidence of such coalitions forming in other populist-led countries like Slovenia, Hungary, and Turkey. But there's also reason to believe that this may be less successful in the future: several remaining populist leaders have make institutional changes to insulate their power and may be more difficult to remove
Capitalizing on Crisis? Western European Populists and Covid-19, Past and Future. Mar. 5, 2021.
In this piece, we investigate the responses of right-wing populists to Covid-19 and their governments' policies in Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden. We find that responses to their governments' policies varied greatly in the initial weeks of Covid-19, ranging from highly restrained responses among Nordic country populists to very aggressive responses by populists in France, the Netherlands, and Spain. Response aggressiveness was positively correlated with case and death rates, although we argue that response aggressiveness was determined at least as much by future concerns regarding coalition formation as it was about substantive criticisms of government policy.
Populists who had restrained themselves in the initial weeks of the pandemic became more critical of their governments into the summer, focusing on non-transparency of policymaking, excessive restrictions on individual freedoms, and a lack of support for small businesses. Unlike in the United States, criticisms of China and Covid-19 conspiracy theories were limited to a few countries and were more common among the public than populist politicians.
We close the piece with a discussion of how the economic fallout from Covid-19 might affect support for populism. Governments have used extensive furlough programs to support businesses and wages but as these programs are wound down, many (especially small) businesses are likely to close. Small business owners are especially likely to support right-wing populists and populists can cater to the economic concerns of this group better than mainstream left and right parties, which depend more on knowledge economy workers less affected by Covid-19. But Covid-19 has also sped up the adoption of new technologies that threaten many knowledge economy jobs in western Europe. While these workers are currently unlikely to support right-wing populists, job loss and the attendant loss of social status could increase support for populists among them in the future.
Populists in Power: Perils and Prospects in 2021. Jan. 18, 2021.
Donald Trump’s attempts to subvert the democratic process and peaceful transfer of power illustrate the risks associated with populist leaders, who undermine the norms and institutions on which liberal democracy depends. But Trump is just the most salient example of populists in power around the world. Our annual study takes stock of the prevalence of populist leaders globally at the start of 2021. We find that the number of populist leaders in power around the world is down from its mid-2010s high, but it is close to the same level as at the start of the last decade. The composition of populist leaders in power has shifted. Cultural populists now constitute the majority of all populist leaders.
Trump’s loss may constrain other populist leaders around the world as they will likely have less international support and voters may become tired of their antics. But his absence is unlikely to damage their electoral prospects since most came to power before Trump was elected and base their support on domestic issues. Most are savvy and will adjust their behavior accordingly. US institutions are strong and held up against Trump’s attempts to subvert them. Countries with weaker institutions may be less likely to withstand a similar onslaught by a populist leader.
The Covid-19 pandemic has had some counterintuitive political effects, with populist leaders who took Covid-19 seriously in many cases receiving a polling boost. Opposition populist parties in western Europe took a polling hit in the first three months of the pandemic but had returned almost to their pre-Covid-19 polling levels by the end of October. The economic fallout from Covid-19 will create opportunities for cultural populists in advanced democracies.
Pandemic Populism: An Analysis of Populist Leaders' Responses to Covid-19. Aug. 17, 2020.
While the perception of populist politicians' responses to Covid-19 is that they've downplayed it, we find that this hasn't been the case for most of the populist leaders currently in power in our database. Of the 17 populist leaders in power at the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, we find that only 5 (including Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil) have consistently tried to downplay the significance of the virus. But while 12 of the 17 populists in power took the virus seriously, including adopting science-driven policies and giving a prominent role to experts, we found that their approaches in handling it differed. We found that 4 of our 17 populist leaders took a liberal serious response and didn't use the pandemic to crack down on their opponents. But we also found that 5 of our 17 populist leaders took an illiberal serious response, using the pandemic to try to pass controversial legislation, enact harsh lockdowns, and enforce these lockdowns in ways that were biased against their political opponents. 3 of our 17 leaders took intermediate responses. While the 5 leaders who downplayed the crisis represented all of our three types of populists (Socio-Economic, Anti-Establishment, and Cultural), we found that only Cultural Populists took an illiberal serious response, often using the pandemic to gain the upper hand in the cultural conflicts that they used to attain power. We close with a discussion of how Covid-19 is unlikely to kill populism and may even strengthen it in the long-run.
High Tide? Populism in Power 1990-2020 (with Jordan Kyle). Feb. 7, 2020.
In this piece, we update our Populists in Power database on which democratic countries contain populist leaders through early 2019. We find that the number of populists in power in 2019 was near an all-time high at 19, but that the composition of populist leaders had changed over this period. While in earlier periods, most populist leaders either left-wing populists (which we call Socio-Economic populists) or rose in opposition to a long-entrenched regime (which we call Anti-Establishment populists), most current populist leaders in power are right-wing Cultural Populists. These are leaders like Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro, who mobilize voters over cultural grievances, including opposition to cultural elites and often on issues involving immigration and religious or ethnic minorities.
Public Opinion on Climate Change
Temperatures Rising? Avoiding Division on Net Zero (with Daniel Newport). Aug. 10, 2022.
While concern about climate change has been rising in recent years, including through the Covid-19 pandemic, questions remain about the underlying drivers of these concerns and how people believe that we should respond to them. This report examines these underlying concerns about climate change and what to do about them in a sample of ~2,500 British respondents conducted in early spring 2022, focusing in particular on how these beliefs differ by political values.
First, we establish that concern about climate change did not appear to be affected by Russia's war in Ukraine or the cost-of-living crisis. Second, we find a high degree of consensus across political values in the reasons that people are concerned about climate change. They are mostly concerned about the effect that it will have on the environment and their children and grandchildren. They believe that policies to address climate change should focus on these. They are less persuaded by secondary benefits that climate change action might have, for example in creating high-paying green jobs or helping make the UK a global leader in the development of green technology. While they may welcome these outcomes, they do not see them as the primary reasons for action.
While concerns about climate change and reasons to address it are similar across political views, some of the potential actions to address it are more controversial. We find that concerns about cost differ between those with conservative and liberal cultural values; the former care more about the costs of action to themselves while the latter are more concerned about costs to the poor. Those with liberal cultural values are willing to cut meat from their diets while those with conservative cultural values emphatically are not; they report that they would be less willing to do this than to buy an electric vehicle!
But another area in which there is consensus across political values is more concerning: there is a shared belief that most governments, including the UK government will not meet their climate change targets. We discuss the implications of this lack of trust in government for building a coalition to support Net Zero action. We recommend that the government create a Home Energy Service that can provide information and assistance to homeowners to retrofit their homes for lower emissions and that policy solutions provide secondary benefits, like environmental restoration, in addition to their benefits in reducing carbon emissions.
Planes, Homes and Automobiles: The Role of Behaviour Change in Delivering Net Zero (with Tim Lord). Aug. 19, 2021.
While most reductions in carbon emissions to date have been in industry, the next phase of emissions reductions necessary to attain the UK government's goal of net zero emissions will require behavioral changes from individuals. In this report, we examine people's knowledge about what behavioral changes will be required of them and their willingness to make such changes in their lives. We find that while people have become much more aware of climate change and the government's net zero agenda, their understanding about what will be required of them is limited. Most believe that they personally are doing enough to tackle climate change and that big companies and government need to take further action. People are increasingly receptive to a variety of public policy measures to combat climate change, like air travel taxes and banning petrol cars, but across political beliefs, people are much more reluctant to cut back on or pay higher costs for every day things, like cutting meat from their diets or paying new taxes on gas.
Polls Apart: Mapping the Politics of Net Zero (with Tim Lord and Ian Mulheirn). Mar. 22, 2021.
The UK government has committed to reducing its carbon emissions by 40% by 2030 and 100%--or net zero--by 2050. But accomplishing these goals will require building a political coalition to support the requisite major policy changes. As a first step toward this, we examine the British public's attitudes toward climate change issues and how these have changed over the last ~10 years. We find that all groups, both by demography and political attitudes, have become more likely to be concerned about climate change and that it is caused largely by human action. Those in higher social classes and with higher incomes are more likely to have these views. Surprisingly, we find little attitude gap between urban and rural respondents and that the age gap is shrinking.
Climate change attitudes are divided on both a social open-closed dimension and an economic left-right one with the latter group in both being less likely to be concerned about it. But the open-closed divide is much wider than the left-right divide. Also, the open-closed divide has become a much stronger predictor of voting behavior in the past five years, with open attitudes voters now mostly supporting Labour and closed attitudes voters now mostly supporting the Conservatives. While we don't find polarization in climate change attitudes on this dimension--both open and closed attitudes voters are becoming more concerned about climate change--the increased salience of the open-closed divide and closely related culture war issues could bleed into climate change attitudes and create polarization here if conservative politicians/media types push an association between these.
Temperatures Rising? Avoiding Division on Net Zero (with Daniel Newport). Aug. 10, 2022.
While concern about climate change has been rising in recent years, including through the Covid-19 pandemic, questions remain about the underlying drivers of these concerns and how people believe that we should respond to them. This report examines these underlying concerns about climate change and what to do about them in a sample of ~2,500 British respondents conducted in early spring 2022, focusing in particular on how these beliefs differ by political values.
First, we establish that concern about climate change did not appear to be affected by Russia's war in Ukraine or the cost-of-living crisis. Second, we find a high degree of consensus across political values in the reasons that people are concerned about climate change. They are mostly concerned about the effect that it will have on the environment and their children and grandchildren. They believe that policies to address climate change should focus on these. They are less persuaded by secondary benefits that climate change action might have, for example in creating high-paying green jobs or helping make the UK a global leader in the development of green technology. While they may welcome these outcomes, they do not see them as the primary reasons for action.
While concerns about climate change and reasons to address it are similar across political views, some of the potential actions to address it are more controversial. We find that concerns about cost differ between those with conservative and liberal cultural values; the former care more about the costs of action to themselves while the latter are more concerned about costs to the poor. Those with liberal cultural values are willing to cut meat from their diets while those with conservative cultural values emphatically are not; they report that they would be less willing to do this than to buy an electric vehicle!
But another area in which there is consensus across political values is more concerning: there is a shared belief that most governments, including the UK government will not meet their climate change targets. We discuss the implications of this lack of trust in government for building a coalition to support Net Zero action. We recommend that the government create a Home Energy Service that can provide information and assistance to homeowners to retrofit their homes for lower emissions and that policy solutions provide secondary benefits, like environmental restoration, in addition to their benefits in reducing carbon emissions.
Planes, Homes and Automobiles: The Role of Behaviour Change in Delivering Net Zero (with Tim Lord). Aug. 19, 2021.
While most reductions in carbon emissions to date have been in industry, the next phase of emissions reductions necessary to attain the UK government's goal of net zero emissions will require behavioral changes from individuals. In this report, we examine people's knowledge about what behavioral changes will be required of them and their willingness to make such changes in their lives. We find that while people have become much more aware of climate change and the government's net zero agenda, their understanding about what will be required of them is limited. Most believe that they personally are doing enough to tackle climate change and that big companies and government need to take further action. People are increasingly receptive to a variety of public policy measures to combat climate change, like air travel taxes and banning petrol cars, but across political beliefs, people are much more reluctant to cut back on or pay higher costs for every day things, like cutting meat from their diets or paying new taxes on gas.
Polls Apart: Mapping the Politics of Net Zero (with Tim Lord and Ian Mulheirn). Mar. 22, 2021.
The UK government has committed to reducing its carbon emissions by 40% by 2030 and 100%--or net zero--by 2050. But accomplishing these goals will require building a political coalition to support the requisite major policy changes. As a first step toward this, we examine the British public's attitudes toward climate change issues and how these have changed over the last ~10 years. We find that all groups, both by demography and political attitudes, have become more likely to be concerned about climate change and that it is caused largely by human action. Those in higher social classes and with higher incomes are more likely to have these views. Surprisingly, we find little attitude gap between urban and rural respondents and that the age gap is shrinking.
Climate change attitudes are divided on both a social open-closed dimension and an economic left-right one with the latter group in both being less likely to be concerned about it. But the open-closed divide is much wider than the left-right divide. Also, the open-closed divide has become a much stronger predictor of voting behavior in the past five years, with open attitudes voters now mostly supporting Labour and closed attitudes voters now mostly supporting the Conservatives. While we don't find polarization in climate change attitudes on this dimension--both open and closed attitudes voters are becoming more concerned about climate change--the increased salience of the open-closed divide and closely related culture war issues could bleed into climate change attitudes and create polarization here if conservative politicians/media types push an association between these.
Op-Eds/Blog Posts
My Global Progressive Politics Blog--Medium
How to Address the Growing Backlash against Net-Zero Policy (with Tone Langengen). TBI Blog Post. Aug. 3, 2023.
There's Good News on the Anti-Populist Front--No Really! Newsweek. Jan. 10, 2023
La Strategie Economique de Liz Truss n'est pas sans risque. Le Monde (in French). Sep. 6, 2022 The Cultural Conservative Consensus for the Tories is Waning. TBI Blog Post. Aug. 31, 2022.
Populist-led Governments are More Likely to be Punished for Rising Covid-19 Deaths. LSE EUROPP Blog. Jan. 28, 2022.
Did Countries with Populist Leaders Suffer More from Covid? LSE Covid-19 Blog. Aug. 23, 2021.
Climate Policy Can Rebuild the Beleaguered Social Democratic Electoral Alliance. TBI Blog Post. Jul. 20, 2021.
Capitalizing on a Crisis? Assessing the Impact of Covid-19 on Populist Parties in Western Europe. LSE EUROPP Blog. Mar. 16, 2021.
Another Populist Moment? Inside Story. Dec. 10, 2020.
Covid-19 and Cultural Populist Parties in Europe: Short-Term Cost, Long-Term Gain? TBI Blog Post. Nov. 19, 2020.
Trump and Bolsonaro's Coronavirus Response was Poor, but That Doesn't Mean all Populists are Bad in a Crisis. The Independent. Aug. 17, 2020.
How to Address the Growing Backlash against Net-Zero Policy (with Tone Langengen). TBI Blog Post. Aug. 3, 2023.
There's Good News on the Anti-Populist Front--No Really! Newsweek. Jan. 10, 2023
La Strategie Economique de Liz Truss n'est pas sans risque. Le Monde (in French). Sep. 6, 2022 The Cultural Conservative Consensus for the Tories is Waning. TBI Blog Post. Aug. 31, 2022.
Populist-led Governments are More Likely to be Punished for Rising Covid-19 Deaths. LSE EUROPP Blog. Jan. 28, 2022.
Did Countries with Populist Leaders Suffer More from Covid? LSE Covid-19 Blog. Aug. 23, 2021.
Climate Policy Can Rebuild the Beleaguered Social Democratic Electoral Alliance. TBI Blog Post. Jul. 20, 2021.
Capitalizing on a Crisis? Assessing the Impact of Covid-19 on Populist Parties in Western Europe. LSE EUROPP Blog. Mar. 16, 2021.
Another Populist Moment? Inside Story. Dec. 10, 2020.
Covid-19 and Cultural Populist Parties in Europe: Short-Term Cost, Long-Term Gain? TBI Blog Post. Nov. 19, 2020.
Trump and Bolsonaro's Coronavirus Response was Poor, but That Doesn't Mean all Populists are Bad in a Crisis. The Independent. Aug. 17, 2020.